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HOME SWEET HOME?
WORKPLACE CASUALTIES OF CONSUMER-
DIRECTED HOME CARE FOR THE ELDERLYt
PEGGIE R. SMITH*
INTRODUCTION
Public funding for home care workers enables many elderly
individuals who require long-term care to age in place, in their
homes and their communities, rather than in an institutional set-
ting such as a nursing home.' As the demand for home care
services grows,' a noticeable shift in health care policy is occur-
ring. Whereas health care professionals traditionally direct the
provision of publicly-funded home care services, states are
increasingly funding consumer-directed home care.3 Consumer-
directed care ("CDC") emphasizes the ability of disabled and eld-
erly persons to evaluate their own needs, to choose the services
that will best satisfy those needs, and to direct home care workers
in delivering those services.4
t On November 9, 2006, the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy hosted a symposium entitled "Long-Term Care for America's Elderly:
Who is Responsible, and How Will it Be Achieved?". Professor Smith was the
first speaker at the Symposium. Her remarks have been revised for publication.
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa, College of Law. J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1993; M.A., Yale University, 1990; B.A., Yale University, 1987.
1. The Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 597
(1999) increased access to home care services for the disabled. See Andrew I.
Batavia, A Right to Personal Assistance Services: "Most Integrated Setting Appropriate"
Requirements and the Independent Living Model of Long-Term Care, 27 AM. J. L. &
MED. 17 (2001) (discussing Olmstead and consumer-directed care).
2. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OCCUPA-
TIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK-ToMoRROW'S JOBS 5 (2005), http://www.bls.
gov/oco/pdf/oco2003.pdf [hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK]
(listing home health aides as the occupation that is expected to grow the fastest
between 2004 and 2014, with an expected growth rate of 60 percent).
3. See A.E. Benjamin & Ruth E. Matthias, Wor*-Life Differences and Outcomes
for Agency and Consumer-Directed Home-Care Workers, 44 GERONTOLOGIST 479, 480
(2004); Heather Young & Suzanne Sikma, Self-Directed Care: An Evaluation, 4
POL'Y, POL. & NURSING PRAC. 185, 185 (2003).
4. See infra Part I.A. (discussing consumer-directed home care and distin-
guishing it from agency home care).
538 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 21
CDC stands in sharp relief to professional home care mod-
els, often referred to as agency-based care.' Under the latter
approach, professionals hire, train, supervise, and, if necessary,
terminate home care workers.6 By contrast, a consumer-directed
approach enables clients, as consumers, to make key decisions
regarding home care including whom to hire as a worker, the
type of services to be provided, how they should be provided, and
whether to fire the worker.7 While CDC proponents applaud its
ability to empower consumers,' this Essay argues that CDC con-
flicts with the availability of workplace rights for home care
workers.
The conflict hinges on the home care labor arrangement.
In agency-based home care, the agency employs the workers and
must abide by applicable employment laws.9 Under a CDC
model, however, the labor arrangement is often murky; because
CDC heightens the likelihood that the law will deny coverage to
home care workers based on a determination that they are either
independent contractors or exempt domestic service employ-
ees, l0 workers may be unsure if they even have a legally protected
employment relationship. Assuming that a statutory employ-
ment relationship exists, the question arises as to whom the rela-
tionship runs. Possible answers include the consumer and public
funding agencies that sponsor home care programs.
Despite the growing importance of home care, the legal
literature is virtually void of scholarship that considers CDC's
impact on the workplace rights of home care workers.1 This
5. A.E. Benjamin, Consumer-Directed Services at Home: A New Model for Per-
sons with Disabilities, 20 HEALTH AFFS. 80, 82 (2001) (describing the delivery of
home care by agencies).
6. Jane Tilly et al., Consumer-Directed Home and Community Services Programs
in Five Countries: Policy Issues for Older People and Government, 24 GENERATIONS 74,
74 (2000) ("[Tlraditional homecare programs rely on public or private agen-
cies to supply and supervise the workers who serve program beneficiaries.").
7. Benjamin & Matthias, supra note 3, at 480 (noting that in CDC home
care, clients are "able to recruit and hire their own workers and supervise their
own services with modest or minimal agency involvement"); Tilly et al., supra
note 6, at 77 ("Consumer direction gives beneficiaries . . . the power to hire,
fire, and supervise workers.").
8. See, e.g., A.E. Benjamin & Ruth E. Matthias, Age, Consumer Direction, and
Outcomes of Supportive Services at Home, 41 GERONTOLOGIST 632, 634 (2001)
("[S]upporters of consumer direction argue that recipients who direct their
own services become more empowered in the process of designing and guiding
their own care .... ").
9. See infra Part I.
10. See infra discussion accompanying notes 50-51.
11. For exceptions, see Sandra L. Hughes & Charles P. Sabatino, Address-
ing Liability Issues in Consumer-Directed Personal Assistance Services (CDPAS): The
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Essay helps to fill that gap by examining select employment stat-
utes to demonstrate how the transition from publicly-funded
agency care to CDC may hamper workers' ability to achieve legal
recognition and protection as rights-bearing employees. It also
explores the labor movement's emergence as a powerful force to
promote the workers' economic well-being and to halt the efforts
of state and local governments to cast them as "rightless" inde-
pendent contractors.
Part I of this Essay discusses some of the relevant themes that
characterize long-term care for the elderly. These themes
include CDC's growing popularity, the aging of the baby boom
generation, and the harsh working conditions that prevail in
home care. Parts II and III explore CDC's implications for home
care workers, focusing on workplace rights and protections. Part
II approaches the analysis from the standpoint of elderly clients
as consumers. It considers the following question: how, and to
what extent, does a transition from agency care to CDC influence
the availability of employment rights for home care workers?
Part III considers the same question but from the perspective of
government agencies that sponsor consumer-directed home care
programs on behalf of elderly persons who qualify for publicly-
funded services. As the discussion in this Part reveals, state fund-
ing agencies generally look to disclaim mandated employer obli-
gations for home care workers in CDC programs, arguing that
the workers are state contractors, not employees.
Part IV considers what the future might hold for home care
workers in CDC programs. On the one hand, states will likely
continue structuring consumer-directed home care so as to mini-
mize the possibility that they will incur employment liability to
workers. 2 On the other hand, the labor movement will likely
continue advancing innovative organizing approaches to chal-
lenge the exclusion of consumer-directed home care workers
from employment statutes.1" By pressing state legislatures to des-
ignate a "public authority" to serve as an employer of record for
the workers, labor unions have helped to reverse the erosion of
workplace rights.14
National Cash and Counseling Demonstration, 35 STETSON L. REv. 251 (2005);
Charles P. Sabatino & Simi Litvak, Liability Issues Affecting Consumer-Directed Per-
sonal Assistance Services-Report and Recommendations, 4 ELDER L.J. 247 (1996).
12. See infra discussion accompanying notes 127-31 (discussing the finan-
cial motivations that help fuel CDC).
13. See infra Part IV.B.
14. See infra discussion accompanying notes 142-45.
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I. TRANSFORMATION AND STAGNATION:
A SNAPSHOT OF THE HOME CARE INDUSTRY
A. Contrasting Models of Home Care:
Agency Based and Consumer Directed
Home care refers to the range of in-home services provided
to individuals with long-term care needs to enable them to func-
tion as independently as possible for as long as possible. These
services primarily consist of personal and household duties, but
may also encompass low-level medical tasks such as administering
medications and checking temperatures.'" Under the traditional
agency approach to delivering home care, clients have little
choice about who cares for them. The agency hires and trains
the worker, determines work hours, and decides how the work is
to be performed. 6
Critics of this traditional model argue that agencies are
often unresponsive to clients, relegating clients' needs and inter-
ests to the demands of the agency. For example, agencies may
schedule workers without considering the clients' desires. 7
Thus, a client who prefers to stay up late at night but who
requires assistance in preparing for bed may be forced to go to
bed early because of the worker's inflexible schedule. 8 Such an
approach, observers contend, unnecessarily restricts clients'
autonomy.1 9 While agency-based care remains the primary
method to deliver publicly-funded home care,2 ° dissatisfaction
with it has prompted the growth of CDC.
CDC reflects the philosophy that "individuals with long-term
care needs should be empowered to make decisions about the
services and supports they receive, including having primary con-
trol over the nature of the services, and who, when, and how the
services are delivered ... ." The majority of states have some
15. SeeJane Aronson & Sheila Neysmith, "You're Not Just in There to Do the
Work": Depersonalizing Policies and the Exploitation of Home Care Workers' Labor, 10
GENDER & Soc'y 59, 60 (1996); Anna Loengard &Jeremy Boal, Home Care of the
Frail Elderly, 20 CLINICS IN GERIATRIC MED. 795, 796 (2004).
16. James R. Knickman & Robyn I. Stone, The Public/Private Partnership
Behind the Cash and Counseling Demonstration and Evaluation: Its Origins, Chal-
lenges, and Unresolved Issues, 42 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 362 (2007).
17. Benjamin, supra note 5, at 82; Tilly et al., supra note 6, at 78.
18. Benjamin, supra note 5, at 82.
19. See, e.g., Young & Sikma, supra note 3, at 186 ("Consumer-directed
services challenge the protective nature of most home- and community-based
service programs for older adults... and the attitude that consumers with disa-
bilities are childlike in their need for protection.").
20. Knickman & Stone, supra note 16, at 363.
21. Id. at 364.
HOME SWEET HOME?
form of consumer-directed home care program. 22 Variations
among the programs reveal that CDC is best conceived as "a con-
tinuum of approaches based on the level of decision making,
control, and autonomy allowed in a particular situation. '"23
Although the initial development of consumer-directed
home care programs primarily served young disabled adults,
24
the recent proliferation of programs reflects the growth in
America's elderly population and the accompanying long-term
care consequences. Between 2003 and 2030, the percentage of
people in the United States aged 65 and older is expected to
increase from 12 percent of the total population to 20 percent.2
5
The projection parallels the aging of the baby boom genera-
tion. 26 The generation includes the 76 million Americans born
between 1946 and 1964.27
For many elderly individuals with disabilities, aging has gen-
erated a demand for long-term care to help with activities such as
bathing, meal preparation, toileting, shopping, and managing
medications. 28 While most elderly individuals who need assis-
tance rely on family and friends to provide informal, unpaid
care,2 9 the demand for formal care has risen as the supply of
informal caregivers has dwindled.3" To help fill this caregiver
gap, states are turning to publicly-subsidized home care.
22. DANIEL R. LEVINSON, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH ANDJ HUMAN SER-
VICES, STATES' REQUIREMENTS FOR MEDICAID-FUNDED PERSONAL CARE SERVICE
ATTENDANTS 23-30 (2006), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-07-05-00250.
pdf (showing in Appendix B that thirty-eight states offer CDC programs that
rely on Medicaid funding).
23. Robyn I. Stone, Consumer Direction in Long-Term Care, 24 GENERATIONS
5, 5-6 (2000) [hereinafter Stone, Consumer Direction].
24. See Andrew I. Batavia, The Growing Prominence of Independent Living and
Consumer Direction as Principles in Long-Term Care: A Content Analysis and Implica-
tions for Elderly People with Disabilities, 10 ELDER L.J. 263, 279 (2002).
25. WAN HE ET AL., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES &
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at 1 (2005),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-209.pdf.
26. See DOUG OWRAM, BORN AT THE RIGHT TIME: A HISTORY OF THE BABY-
BOOM GENERATION (1996).
27. See JAMES T. PATtERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES,
1945-1974, at 77 (1996) (describing the increase in birth rates that started in
1946 and leveled off in 1964).
28. See Douglas A. Wolf, The Family as Provider of Long-Term Care: Efficiency,
Equity, and Externalities, II J. AGING & HEALTH 360, 366 (1999).
29. Id. at 361 (observing that family members are the main source of care
for the elderly).
30. Cf UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LONG-TERM CARE:
SOME STATES APPLY CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS TO HOME CARE WORKERS 4
(1996), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/pe96005.pdf (connecting the
increased reliance on home care with projections which "indicate that labor
2007]
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Although home care has mushroomed over the past decade,
and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future,31 the indus-
try picture looks dim when viewed from the perspective of home
care workers. Home care as a job lags near the bottom of the
economic ladder. In 2003, the median hourly wage for workers
was less than $9.00 an hour,32 and when annualized for full-time
employment, they earned less than $17,000. 3' A lack of work-
related benefits compounds the problem of low wages. Home
care workers rarely receive benefits such as employer paid health
insurance or pension plans.34 In addition, the work is physically
demanding and workers routinely confront workplace hazards
including combative clients, muscle problems occasioned by lift-
ing and moving immobile clients, and unsafe neighborhoods. 5
This disadvantageous state of affairs offers little hope for a
workforce that is dominated by low-income women 36 and dispro-
portionately home to members of racial ethnic groups, especially
African Americans and Hispanics. 37  Because many of these
women are single mothers,3" the job's poor compensation and
the lack of benefits are particularly troublesome. Not surpris-
ingly, many home care workers rely on public assistance to sus-
tain themselves and their families.39 For those workers who are
force participation will continue to increase among women, who have tradition-
ally provided much of the informal care for the elderly").
31. See OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, supra note 2 (noting that
home care has an expected growth rate of close to 60 percent by 2014).
32. BERNADETTE WRIGHT, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, DIRECT CARE
WORKERS IN LONG-TERM CARE 1 (2005), http://www.hcbs.org/files/75/3748/
directcare.pdf (reporting a 2003 median hourly wage of $8.75 for home health
aides and $8.05 for personal and home care aides).
33. Id. (reporting annualized full-time employment earnings of $16,750
for personal and home-care aides, and $18,200 for home-health aides).
34. STEVE DAWSON & RICK SURPIN, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, DIRECT CARE
HEALTH WORKERS: THE UNNECESSARY CRISIS 6 (2001), http://www.directcare
clearinghouse.org/download/Aspen.pdf ("The quality of direct-care jobs tends
to be extremely poor. Wages are low and benefits few.. . .") (citation omitted).
35. Margaret A. Denton et al., Working in Clients' Homes: The Impact on the
Mental Health and Well-Being of Visiting Home Care Workers, 21 HOME HEALTH CARE
SERVICES Q. 1, 6 (2002) (citations omitted).
36. DAWSON & SURPIN, supra note 34, at 12 ("The typical direct-care
worker is a low-income woman . . ").
37. See id. (stating that "86 percent of [direct care workers] are women,
30 percent are women of color").
38. Id. ("The typical direct-care worker... is a single mother...
39. Id. at 2 ("[M]any low-income health care workers are still entangled
in public programs such as food stamps .... "). See also WILLIAM SCANLON, U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING WORKFORCE RECRUITMENT AND RETEN-
TION OF NURSES AND NURSE AIDES IS A GROWING CONCERN 13 (2001), http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d01750t.pdf (reporting that "aides working in nursing
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immigrants and in some cases undocumented, their economic
situation may be further hampered by limited alternative employ-
ment opportunities.
While the working conditions of both agency-based home
care workers and CDC workers require improvement, studies
indicate that the former group fares slightly better than the latter
group in terms of tangible bread-and-butter issues. In a study of
California's publicly-funded home care program, In-Home Sup-
portive Services (IHSS), researchers found that workers hired
under consumer direction received wages that were 30 percent
less than those received by agency employed workers.4" With
respect to fringe benefits, 40 percent of California agency work-
ers received health benefits, paid sick leave and paid vacation,
while few CDC workers received such benefits.4
These differences confirm the importance of examining
CDC's effects on the employment rights of home care workers.
As stated in the introduction, the potential negative impact of
consumer-directed home care for workers pivots on the labor
arrangement. Eligibility for unemployment compensation, mini-
mum wage and overtime protection, social security and the like,
depends on the workers' status as employees as opposed to self-
employed independent contractors.42 Both of the two primary
tests to determine worker status, the common law control test43
and the economic reality test,4 4 underscore the putative
employer's right to control the means and methods of the
homes and home health care are more than twice as likely as other workers to
be receiving food stamps and Medicaid, and they are much more likely to lack
health insurance").
40. Benjamin & Matthias, supra note 3, at 482. Despite the 30 percent
wage differential reported by the study's authors, they inexplicably conclude
with the following observation: "we conclude that there is little difference in
worker outcomes between the two models." Id. at 486.
41. See Tilly et al., supra note 6, at 80 (reporting on a study by A.E.
Benjamin).
42. Marc Linder, What Is an Employee? Why It Does, But Should Not, Matter, 7
LAw & INEQUALITY 155, 157-58 (1989) (listing various "benefits and protections
conditioned on the existence of an employment relationship").
43. See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees:
Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27
BERKELEYJ. EMp. & LAB. L. 251, 282 (2006) ("Under the right to control test,
'employees' are defined as those whose work tasks the employer controls and
'independent contractors' are those whose work tasks are not controlled by the
employer.").
44. The economic reality test defines "employee" according to the pur-
pose of the statute and considers whether the worker is dependent on the busi-
ness as a matter of economic realities. The test evaluates a range of factors, in
addition to control, to determine whether an employment relationship exists,
including the workers' investment in the facilities, opportunities for profit or
2007]
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worker's performance. 45 The greater the control, the more
likely it is that an employment relationship exists.16 With agency-
based home care, the agency usually exercises considerable con-
trol over the worker,47 and consequently qualifies as the worker's
employer. CDC complicates this picture as it involves far more
potential employers than does agency care. The next two Parts
of the Essay examine two possible employers: individual consum-
ers and public agencies that fund and operate home care
programs.
II. CONSUMERS AS POTENTIAL EMPLOYERS
Because CDC reflects a continuum, defined by the degree of
control the consumer possesses,4" whether a given consumer is
an employer depends on the specific labor arrangement and the
applicable law. However, as the following discussion illustrates,
even when a consumer exercises sufficient control over a worker
to trigger an employment relationship, the law may still deny the
worker coverage by treating her as an exempt domestic service
employee. Domestic service exemptions, which are common
components in employment laws, typically operate to exclude
individuals who perform domestic activities in the households of
their employers.49 The exemptions often encompass home care
because the work entails duties that overlap with those per-
formed in domestic service." ° Because the exemptions tend to
apply only to an employment relationship that involves a private
loss, the permanence of the relationship, and the skill of the workers. United
States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716 (1947).
45. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It
Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 314
(2001) ("Both [tests] have control and domination as their central
concern . . ").
46. See David L. Gregory, Br(e)aking the Exploitation of Labor?: Tensions
Regarding the Welfare Workforce, 25 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 1, 9 (1997).
47. See supra discussion accompanying notes 6 and 16.
48. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
49. See generally NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, OUT OF THE
SHADOWS: STRATEGIES FOR EXPANDING STATE LABOR AND CIVIL RIGHTS PROTEC-
TIONS FOR DOMESTIC WORKERS app. B (1997) (providing a state-by-state overview
of employment laws that exclude domestic service).
50. See, e.g., infra note 56 and accompanying text (Fair Labor Standards
Act's definition of domestic service extends to home care); infra note 86 and
accompanying text (Occupational Safety and Health Administration's regula-
tion defining domestic service extends to home care); infra note 94 and accom-
panying text (definition of domestic service in workers' compensation statutes
extends to home care).
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household as an employer,5" they primarily pose concerns for
consumer-directed home care workers. This Part examines the
status of home care workers employed by individual consumers
under federal employment laws as well as state workers' compen-
sation statutes.
A. The Fair Labor Standards Act
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires covered
employers to comply with minimum wage52 and overtime provi-
sions.5" In 1974, Congress amended the FLSA and specifically
extended coverage to domestic service employees54 performing
services of a household nature in or about the private home of
the person by whom they are employed.55 The Department of
Labor (DOL) has interpreted domestic service to encompass
home care workers including "nurses, certified nurse aides,
home health aides, and other individuals providing home health
care services ... in or about a private household. 5
6
Despite the 1974 amendment, employers can still deny cer-
tain domestic service employees FLSA protection because of the
Act's companionship services exemption. The exemption
excludes a subset of domestic service employees from the FLSA,
namely persons "employed in domestic service employment to
provide companionship services for individuals who (because of
age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves. '5 7 Because
the DOL has concluded that domestic service extends to home
care workers,58 the companionship services exemption may
51. See, e.g., Success Vill. Apartments, Inc. v. Local 376, 397 A.2d 85, 87
(Conn. 1978) (domestic service for purposes of the National Labor Relations
Act applies to employment on an individual and personal basis); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1975.6 (2006) (domestic service employers for purposes of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act refers to those "individuals who, in their own residences,
privately employ persons"); 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (2006) (for FLSA purposes
domestic service employment is defined as "services of a household nature per-
formed by an employee in or about a private home (permanent or temporary)
of the person by whom he or she is employed").
52. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2000).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 206(f) (1) (including domestic service workers in the min-
imum wage provisions); 29 U.S.C. § 207(1) (including domestic service workers
in the overtime provisions).
55. 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (2006).
56. Alfred B. Robinson Jr., Opinion Letter, Fair Labor Standards Act:
Domestic Service Exemption, FLSA 2005-13 (Mar. 17, 2005), http://hr.blr.
com/timesavers.aspx?id=17553.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (15) (2000).
58. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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relieve their employers of an obligation to provide minimum
wages and overtime. 59
At present, it is unclear if the companionship services
exemption applies to home care workers employed by agencies.
Several courts have decided the issue,6" with most holding that
the exemption covers workers employed by private households as
well as workers employed by third-party employers such as home
care agencies. 61 However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reached the opposite result in Coke v. Long Island Care Home.62
According to Coke, home care agencies must abide by the FLSA
and pay workers minimum wages and overtime.6"
Coke is currently on appeal to the Supreme Court 64 and as a
result, the FLSA status of agency workers is in limbo. If the
Supreme Court affirms Coke, agency home care workers will
receive FLSA protection even if their work would otherwise fall
under the rubric of companionship services, while the law will
exclude similarly situated workers employed by individual con-
sumers. Although this distinction is unlikely to result in CDC
home care workers receiving less than the minimum wage given
that their median hourly wage exceeds the minimum wage,65 it
may have an adverse affect on overtime compensation. If an
agency-employed home care worker cares for more than one cli-
ent, and the total hours worked for all clients exceed forty in a
59. If a domestic service employee qualifies for an exception to the com-
panionship services exemption, she will still be covered by the FLSA. There are
two exceptions: the general household work exception and the trained person-
nel exception. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (2006) (explaining the companionship ser-
vices exemption does not apply if such services include general household work
that exceeds "20 percent of the total weekly hours worked"); id. ("The term
'companionship services' does not include services relating to the care and pro-
tection of the aged or infirm which require and are performed by trained per-
sonnel, such as a registered or practical nurse.").
60. See generally Peggie R. Smith, Aging and Caring in the Home: Regulating
Paid Domesticity in the 21st Century, 92 IOWA L. REv. (forthcoming 2007) [herein-
after Smith, Aging and Caring] (listing cases and examining the FLSA's
approach to home care workers employed by third-party home care agencies).
61. Id. See also 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a) (2006) ("Employees who are
engaged in providing companionship services... and who are employed by an
employer or agency other than the family or household using their services, are
exempt from the Act's minimum wage and overtime pay requirements . . ").
62. Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 376 F.3d 118 (2nd Cir.
2004), vacated 126 S. Ct. 1189 (2006), affd in part, vacated in part, 462 F.3d 48
(2nd Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 853 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2007) (No. 06-593).
63. Coke, 376 F.3d at 135.
64. See Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 853 (U.S. Jan. 5,
2007) (No. 06-593).
65. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (noting the median
wage for home care workers).
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week, the agency must provide overtime compensation.66 Hence
an agency worker, who cares for two clients in a week-working
twenty-five hours for one and nineteen for the other-is entitled
to overtime compensation. By contrast, if each of the two clients
is a separate consumer employer, the worker will not qualify for
overtime even though the total hours exceed forty in a week. To
qualify for overtime in a CDC context, the worker must work
more than forty hours a week for a single consumer.
B. The National Labor Relations Act
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)6 7 guarantees
employees the right to organize and to form a union for pur-
poses of collective bargaining.6 The NLRA expressly excludes
domestic service workers from coverage.69 While the Act does
not define the term "domestic service," according to the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), it applies to "employment on an
individual and personal basis."7 ° Based on this understanding,
the NLRB has held that the exemption does not exclude from
the NLRA individuals in domestic service who are employed by
an organization, such as a home care agency, to provide personal
care services.71
For example, in Ankh Services, a home care agency con-
tracted with the state of Missouri to serve various clients, includ-
ing the elderly.72 The NLRB found that the agency exercised
"substantial, if not total, control over the wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment of its in-home service work-
66. 29 C.F.R. § 778.103 (2006) ("If in any workweek an employee is cov-
ered by the [FLSA] and is not exempt from its overtime pay requirements, the
employer must total all the hours worked by the employee for him in that work-
week.., and pay overtime compensation for each hour worked in excess of the
maximum hours .. ").
67. Ch. 372, §§ 1-15, 49 Stat. 449, 449-57 (1935) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000)); 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
69. Section 2(3) of the Act excludes from the definition of "employee"
anyone employed "in the domestic service of any family or person at his home."
29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
70. 30 Sutton Place Corp., 240 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 n.6 (1979) (quoting Suc-
cess Vill. Apartments, Inc., supra note 51, at 87).
71. See, e.g., Success Vill. Apartments, Inc., supra note 51, at 87 (stating
that the meaning of "domestic service" under the NLRA "cannot be enlarged to
include a maintenance crew or a clerical staff for a 924-unit housing complex");
Shore Club Condo. Ass'n v. NLRB, 400 F.3d 1336 (lth Cir. 2005) (workers
who performed maintenance and cleaning services at a condominium were
domestic service workers covered under the NLRA as employees of the
condominium).
72. Ankh Services, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 478, 478 (1979).
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ers, and that the Employer is thus able effectively to engage in
meaningful bargaining over these matters with a labor organiza-
tion representing them."73 The agency insisted that despite this
finding, it had no obligation to bargain with a representative of
the workers because they were exempt domestic service employ-
ees.74 The Board rejected this argument, concluding that the
workers were not "employed by the homeowner or resident of
the home in which they perform their domestic services."75 The
Board further observed that even if services are domestic in qual-
ity and performed in the home, the exclusion does not apply
when the employer is an agency.
76
Although agency home care workers possess NLRA bargain-
ing rights, the same cannot be said for workers in the employ of
individual consumers. The NLRA clearly excludes this latter
group of workers given that the exemption applies to "employ-
ment on an individual and personal basis."7 7 The result is that
those home care workers who most need the Act's protections
are denied them. That said, even if the NLRA did apply to con-
sumer-directed home care workers, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for such workers to bargain effectively with their con-
sumer clients. Questions that I raised in the context of domestic
service apply with equal force to home care work:78
Imagine... that a group of domestics joined together and
designated a union as their representative, and that the
household employers of those workers were legally obli-
gated to bargain with the union. What would such a bar-
gaining model look like? . .. Because the workers would
most likely work for different employers, would the union
have to bargain for a separate agreement for each
worker? .. . [B]ecause most domestics work for several
households simultaneously, would a given worker have dif-
ferent, potentially conflicting agreements depending on
the particular employer? . . .These questions reveal that
trying to squeeze domestic service into the existing bar-
gaining model would be impractical .... 7
73. Id. at 479.
74. Id. at 480.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 30 Sutton Place Corp., 240 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 n.6 (1979) (quotingSuc-
cess Vill. Apartments, Inc., supra note 51, at 87).
78. Peggie Smith, Organizing the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household Work-
ers and Approaches to Employee Representation, 79 N.C. L. REv. 45 (2000) [hereinaf-
ter Smith, Organizing the Unorganizable].
79. Id. at 79-90.
HOME SWEET HOME?
In addition to these practical limitations, it stands to reason that
most elderly persons who employ home care workers through
publicly-funded CDC programs are not financially positioned to
bargain with the workers to pay decent wages or provide fringe
benefits. Compared with CDC, an agency-based home care
model is far better situated to advance the collective interests of
publicly-funded home care workers.
C. The Occupational Safety and Health Act
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)8 °
"assure [s] so far as possible every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working conditions."81 The Act does
not exempt domestic service from coverage but DOL regulations
interpreting the Act do exempt the work.82 The relevant regula-
tion states that "individuals who, in their own residences, pri-
vately employ persons for the purpose of performing... what are
commonly regarded as ordinary domestic household tasks, such
as house cleaning, cooking, and caring for children, shall not be
subject to the requirements of the Act with respect to such
employment.
8 3
Because the DOL defines "domestic service" employers as
those "individuals who, in their own residences, privately employ
persons"8 4 the exemption does not extend to home care workers
who deliver services under an agency-based care model. Conse-
quently, these workers are entitled to the OSH Act's protec-
tions.85 By contrast, the DOL has interpreted the domestic
service exemption to include home care workers employed by
private households.86 Thus, consumers receiving home care ser-
vices under a CDC model are not obligated to comply with spe-
80. See 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6 (2006). See also Smith, Aging and Caring, supra
note 60 (discussing the exclusion of domestic service from the OSH Act).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2000).
82. 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. Although the OSH Act covers agency-based home care workers, the
scope of that coverage is unclear. As I argue elsewhere, because the Act was
developed against the backdrop of industrial and commercial workplaces, it
seems unlikely that much, if any, thought was given to application of the Act to
the home as workplace. Smith, Aging and Caring, supra note 60.
86. Letter from R. Davis Layne, Acting Assistant Secretary, Occupational
Safety & Health Admin., to John J. Genuise, Principal, Byington & Genuise,
L.L.C. (Feb. 21, 2001) (explaining that 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6 "include [s] domestic
household tasks performed for an elderly member of the household which has
employed the employee in question"), http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/
owadisp.show-document?p table=INTERPRETATIONS&p-id=23540.
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cific safety and health standards or the OSH Act's general
requirement that employers keep their workplaces free from rec-
ognized hazards likely to cause death or serious physical harm. 7
As a result, the Act offers CDC workers no protection from vari-
ous hazards including dangerous household objects, exposure to
blood or other infectious material, and injuries occasioned by
lifting and moving clients.8 8 This result is unsettling when one
considers, for example, that home care workers experience seri-
ous musculoskeletal injuries at a rate higher than any other occu-
pational group because the job requires frequent lifting and
moving of elderly clients who often have limited mobility. 89
D. Workers' Compensation
Workers' compensation programs provide medical, disabil-
ity, and other benefits for injuries and illnesses that arise out of
employment and occur in the course of employment.9 ° Because
state law governs the workers' compensation system, coverage for
home care workers varies by state.9 1 Nevertheless, several gen-
eral observations can be made. First, home care workers
employed by agencies appear to have little difficulty maintaining
claims under state workers' compensation programs.92 Second,
whether the laws cover consumer-directed workers depends sig-
nificantly on whether they cover domestic service. Although
most state statutes either do not define domestic service or do so
in vague terms, 93 the available evidence indicates that, as a mat-
87. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
88. Smith, Aging and Caring, supra note 60.
89. Clare L. Stacey, Finding Dignity in Dirty Work: The Constraints and
Rewards of Low-Wage Home Care Labour, 27 Soc. OF HEALTH & ILLNESS 837, 843
(2005).
90. 1 A. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 1.01(d)
(2005).
91. PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETr KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WEL-
FARE STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 5 (2000) ("Workers' com-
pensation . . .was from the beginning legislated at the state level . . .and has
remained a state responsibility ever since.").
92. The differing judicial posture between domestic service workers
employed by members of private households and those employed by agencies
likely reflects Larson's observation that in the latter, the employer can pass the
costs on to consumers. 4 A. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAw
§ 72.02[5] (2005) ("It has always been assumed, rightly or wrongly, that the cost
of compensation protection did not become a burden upon the employer
directly, since he was expected to pass the cost along to the consumer in the
price of the product.").
93. See SUSAN FLANAGAN, ACCESSING WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE
FOR CONSUMER-EMPLOYED PERSONAL ASSISTANCE SERVICE WORKERS: ISSUES, CHAL-
LENGES AND PROMISING PRACTICES 13 (2004), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/
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ter of statutory interpretation, home care gets routinely classified
as domestic service.9" Third, at least half of all states deny com-
pensation to domestic service workers when they are employed
by private households.95 Thus even if a home care consumer
exercises a requisite level of control over the worker to warrant
an employment relationship, under the statute the state may still
deny compensation to the worker.
Home care claimants who have avoided being classified as
domestic service employees have successfully demonstrated that
their duties are sufficiently distinct from the traditional house-
hold duties associated with domestic service. Viola v. Workman's
Compensation Appeal Board illustrates the point.96 Claimant,
employed by a private household to care for an elderly woman,
administered medication to the client, helped her in and out of
the bathtub and bed, assisted in getting her dressed, and fed
her. 7 Based on these duties, the court found that the domestic
service exemption did not apply and the claimant was entitled to
workers' compensation because she did not do housework nor
did she perform "domestic or maid services."" Viola and similar
cases suggest that the more a home care worker's duties resem-
ble those of a practical nurse, the more likely it is that she can
escape the domestic service exemption. 9
III. PUBLIC AGENCIES AS POTENTIAL EMPLOYERS
Even though individual consumers who employ home care
workers may not have to comply with employment law mandates,
an employment relationship may still exist to offer workers some
reports/paswork.pdf ("Forty-five states and five territories do not define domes-
tic service in the definition section of their workers' compensation laws.").
94. Id. at 32 (stating that "the majority of state agency staff reported that
personal care fell under domestic service").
95. See Sabatino & Litvak, supra note 11, at 289 ("Domestic or household
employment is entirely excluded from the workers' compensation system in the
majority of states.").
96. Viola v. Workman's Comp. App. Bd., 549 A.2d 1367 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988).
97. Id. at 1367-68.
98. Id. at 1369.
99. See also Dunagan v. Folkers, 1996 NE Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 267 ("Even if
the employment is within a private household, it may be distinguishable from
domestic service if its essence is . . . that of practical nursing .... ") (quoting
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw, § 50-30 (1995)); McCallister v. Work-
ers' Comp. App. Bd., 132 Cal. Rptr. 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) ("[I]nasmuch as
the applicant's service was solely to care for and wait upon an elderly and inva-
lid woman, and included no duties in connection with the maintenance or
functioning of a household, she was not excluded by the statutory
provision . . ").
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protection. Most notably, a public agency that sponsors a con-
sumer-directed home care program may qualify as an employer.
Although this issue appears not to have arisen frequently in the
reported case law, courts have addressed it in the context of the
FLSA, California's collective bargaining statute, and workers'
compensation statutes. This Part surveys the terrain of these
statutes.
A. Public Agencies as Employers Under the FLSA
Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency' °° is one of the
few cases to consider whether an employment relationship exists,
for purposes of the FLSA, between public agencies that sponsor a
CDC program and home care workers who provide care in the
program. 10' The case concerned California's home care pro-
gram, IHSS. 1°2 Plaintiff home care workers were hired by indi-
vidual consumers who paid for the workers' services with funds
provided by the state.' 03
The workers argued that the state agencies were sufficiently
involved in the home care arrangement between consumers and
workers to qualify as the latter's employer under the FLSA.
Although the consumers were responsible for the day-to-day
supervision of the workers as well as hiring and firing them, 104
the agencies determined the consumer's financial eligibility to
participate in the program; the need for home care services; the
tasks to be performed by the worker for the consumer; the num-
ber of hours that each worker would work; and the rate and
method of payment to the worker." 5 Based on the foregoing,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the agencies exer-
cised sufficient control over the home care relationship to
render them employers of the workers.'0 6
100. Bonnette v. Cal. Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.
1983).
101. See also Godlewska v. Human Dev. Ass'n., Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30519 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2006) (concluding that sufficient facts existed to per-
mit a finding that municipal public agencies involved with the delivery of home
care were employers under the FLSA).
102. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (referencing the California
In-Home Support Services program).
103. Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1468.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1470.
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B. Public Agencies as Employers Under California's
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act
Despite the favorable Bonnette ruling, the California Court of
Appeals adopted a contrary view when it addressed a similar
question under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA),107 the
California law governing labor relations for local government
employees. The Service Employees International Union (SEIU)
initiated the case, Service Employees International Union, Local 434 v.
County of Los Angeles,1°8 against the County of Los Angeles in a
bid to compel the County to negotiate with it on behalf of pub-
licly-funded home care workers in the County.1 °9 Over a vigor-
ous dissent, l ° the court concluded that primary authority to
supervise the workers rested with the individual consumers and
that the County exercised insufficient supervisory control over
the workers to qualify as an employer under the MMBA. 1'
C. Public Agencies as Employers Under Workers' Compensation
Jurisdictions have taken very different approaches when
deciding if public agencies that sponsor CDC programs qualify as
home care employers for purposes of state workers' compensa-
tion statutes. California was one of the first jurisdictions to tackle
the question in In-Home Supportive Services v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board."2 Claimant, Marjorie Bouvia, an IHSS home care
worker, filed for workers' compensation after she injured her
back while helping a client out of a car."1 3 Although Ms. Bouvia
appears to have been an employee of her client, 1 4 she was not
entitled to compensation from the client because California's
workers' compensation statute excludes private domestic service
employment, understood to encompass home care services.1 5
Consequently, the court focused on whether Ms. Bouvia had
a covered employment relationship with the state given that the
107. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 3500 (West, current through Ch. 1 of 2007
Reg.Sess. urgency legislation).
108. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 434 v. County of Los Angeles,
275 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
109. Id, at 510.
110. Id. at 524 (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("[T]he county has the right to
control the activities of the IHSS providers whether it exercises it or not.")
(emphasis omitted).
111. Id. at 514-15.
112. In-Home Supportive Servs. v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd., 199 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
113. Id. at 700.
114. Id. at 704.
115. Id. at 701 & n.5.
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state administered the IHSS program. The court concluded that
such a relationship did exist because the state exercised sufficient
control over IHSS home care workers.' 6 The state determined
the amount and nature of IHSS services required by the client,
the type of services to be provided, and the number of hours of
service to be provided per week." 7 In addition, the state directly
compensated the IHSS worker for the services performed." 8
More recently the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion has considered whether Illinois state agencies that sponsor
publicly-funded home care programs are employers of participat-
ing home care workers under the state's workers' compensation
statute.' In a series of cases, the Commission has given an
affirmative answer, despite the agencies' insistence that they only
have an independent contractor relationship with the workers
and that the clients employ the workers.' ° Along with emphasiz-
ing that the agencies control the work performed, the Commis-
sion observed that the legislature did not intend "that those
handicapped persons receiving [home care] services ... should
be burdened by the cost of providing coverage" to the workers
under the state's workers' compensation statute.12'
Minnesota achieved by statute the result in In-Home Support-
ive Services and the Illinois cases. The Minnesota workers' com-
pensation statute provides that if the state publicly funds home
care services, "then the worker is an employee of the state for
workers' compensation purposes.1 22 Such a statute eliminates
the uncertainty of litigation, being especially beneficial to home
care workers who might otherwise be excluded from coverage on
the theory that they are independent contractors.1 2
116. Id. at 703-04.
117. Id. at 703.
118. Id. But see Harrington v. Michigan, 13 Michigan Workers' Comp.
Law Rep. 1389 (Workers' Comp. App. Comm'n 1999) (stating that a Michigan
state agency was not the employer of a publicly-funded home care worker
because home care workers did not qualify as employees under the relevant
statute).
119. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/8 (West 2004).
120. See Platt v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs., No. 02 WC 22894, 2005 Ill.
Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 1000, at *2-*3 (Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n Dec. 14,
2005) (listing cases).
121. Turner v. Illinois, No. 96 WC 36051, 2002 Ill. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS
261, at *11 (Indus. Comm'n of Ill. March 18, 2002).
122. FLANAGAN, supra note 93, at 33.
123. Id. ("The Minnesota law was enacted in response to an unfavorable
experience . . . encountered in treating [personal assistant service] workers as
independent providers (e.g., independent contractors)."); id. at viii (referring
to personal assistant service workers as "workers who work for service recipients
in and around their homes").
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On the other end of the spectrum is the Oregon approach
which sharply contrasts with the Minnesota statute, and pre-
cludes a determination that a home care worker is a public
employee under the common law control test. Oregon law pro-
vides that the state shall not be liable for workers' compensation
to "home care workers" by virtue of the fact that they provide
publicly-funded home care services, irrespective of whether the
state "selects the person for employment or exercises any direc-
tion or control over the person's employment."'1 24
The above discussions in Parts II and III indicate that while
exceptions exist, the move from agency home care to consumer-
directed home care has eroded the already precarious employ-
ment status of home care workers. Workers cannot reliably
depend on securing protection from individual consumers given
that some employment laws simply deny coverage where the rela-
tionship is between a private household employer and a worker.
Moreover, even when an employment relationship does exist, the
problem remains that some elderly individuals who participate in
CDC may lack the wherewithal, financial or otherwise, 125 to com-
ply with legally-mandated employment obligations. As between
elderly consumers and government-sponsored home care pro-
grams, the latter can best ensure that home care workers receive
basic workplace protections as well as access to benefits such as
health insurance. 126 Although states have been disinclined to
shoulder this responsibility, the next Part argues that doing so
can benefit both home care workers and elderly consumers.
IV. PITFALLS AND PROMISES:
STATES DIG IN AND ORGANIZED LABOR STEPS UP
A. Linking Improved Working Conditions
with Quality Home Care
From the perspective of policymakers, CDC's attractiveness
seems to stem as much from its potential to contain long-term
care costs as from its ability to empower elderly consumers by
allowing them more control over their care. Faced with an aging
124. OR. Rv. STAT. § 411.590 (2005).
125. In some instances, surrogate decision-makers can help incapacitated
consumers comply with employment-related obligations. See Marshall B. Kapp,
From Medical Patients to Health Care Consumers: Decisional Capacity and Choices to
Purchase Coverage and Services, 3 AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 294, 296-99 (1999).
126. See Yoshiko Yamada, Profile of Home Care Aides, Nursing Home Aides,
and Hospital Aides: Historical Changes and Data Recommendations, 42 GERONTOLO-
GIST 199, 204 (2002) (reporting that in 1998, public funds paid for the majority
of all home care services in the United States).
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elderly population that presents significant challenges to health
care funding, states are looking for cost-savings strategies. 127 Evi-
dence suggests that CDC can help reduce the costs of providing-
long term care to the elderly.1 28 Relative to agency care, CDC
involves less administrative expenses' 29 and experts believe that
consumers may make more efficient use of health care
resources. 130
Of course, CDC's cost-savings potential also hinges on the
extent to which states can eliminate the responsibilities and costs
associated with an employment relationship as between the state
and its publicly-funded home care workers.' 3 ' As more states
turn to CDC programs, one can reasonably expect that the pro-
grams will continue to strive to insulate public entities from lia-
bility as the workers' employers. As a report prepared for the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services observes, "[b]y
carefully structuring and documenting the consumer-worker
employment relationship ... states [can] minimize[ ] the likeli-
hood of a credible claim that the state, rather than the con-
sumer, is the worker's employer . ".. ,2 So structured, it is
unlikely that states will have to abide by the aforementioned
employment obligations such as paying overtime to home care
workers or providing workers' compensation.
In theory such an approach will decrease the cost of home
care but the point is debatable. Treating home care workers as
independent contractors, thereby denying them the most basic
workplace rights, is not a cost-free proposition. The working
conditions in home care are woeful, so much so that the annual
127. See, e.g., JOSHUA M. WIENER, STATE COST CONTAINMENT INITIATIVES
FOR LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES FOR OLDER PEOPLE 29-30 (2000) (discussing
cost-saving strategies that states are exploring to curb long-term care expendi-
tures for the elderly), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000056.pdf.
128. See, e.g., Stone, Consumer Direction, supra note 23, at 7 ("[M]any state
policy-makers in the United States are finding consumer direction increasingly
appealing .. . (because of] the potential for cost savings.").
129. Benjamin, supra note 5, at 81 ("Because consumer direction reduces
or eliminates the need for home care agencies and case managers, service costs
are expected to be lower."); Stone, Consumer Direction, supra note 23, at 7
(observing that CDC "[s]avings are also realized through the reduction in
administrative costs that would have been accrued in managing a service-pack-
age program").
130. BARBARA PHILLIPS & BARBARA SCHNEIDER, Changing to Consumer-
Directed Care: The Implementation of the Cash and Counseling Demonstra-
tion in Florida 10 (2004), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/Reports/FLchange.pdf.
131. Id. at 2-3 (observing that because consumers and not the state qual-
ify as employers of home care workers under CDC programs, states can poten-
tially reduce costs, including those associated with collective bargaining).
132. See Hughes & Sabatino, supra note 11, at 351.
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turnover rate is estimated at 40 percent. 3' It should come as no
surprise that home care workers desire alternative employment
opportunities so that they can leave behind a job that is physi-
cally demanding, often injurious, and characterized by low wages
and few benefits."'
Home care consumers pay a price for the job's instability in
the form of inconsistent care and compromised quality of
care. 1 35 When workers leave theirjobs, consumers must adjust to
new workers, a transition that can be especially taxing if the con-
sumer is responsible for hiring and training the worker. Failure
to locate a new worker in a timely manner can result in visits to
hospital emergency rooms or even relocation to an institutional
setting such as a nursing home. 13 6 Importantly, early research
has shown a positive correlation between improved working con-
ditions and quality of care. 1 7 A study evaluating the impact of
higher wages for home care workers in San Francisco suggests
that increased wages enhance workers' commitment to the job,
reduce job turnover, and improve the overall quality of care
provided.13
8
States that avoid employment responsibilities to home care
workers risk exacerbating the current difficulties with attracting
and retaining workers who are committed to delivering quality
care."' While an employment relationship with the state does
not guarantee decent working conditions, it can provide workers
133. Candace Howes, Living Wages and Retention of Homecare Workers in San
Francisco, 44 IND. RELs. 139, 143 (2005).
134. See supra notes 32-35, 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing
home care's working conditions).
135. DoRIE SEAvEy, THE COST OF FRoNTLINE TURNOVER IN LONG-TERM
CAR 15 (2004), http://www.bjbc.org/content/docs/TOCostReport.pdf
("Strong arguments can be made that turnover adversely affects continuity of
care and care recipient relationships, causing disruptions that prevent or inter-
fere with the development of relationships critical to both client and
caregiver.").
136. IiMA C. BERMEA, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, EVALUA-
TION OF PERSONAL ArrENDANT TRANING PROGRAMS 9 (2001), http://www.dhs.
state.tx.us/publications/SB95reportMarch200l.pdf (commenting on the
shortage of home care workers and stating that " [f] or some disabled individu-
als, it means a lack of access to the home health care services they need to live
healthy and productive lives").
137. Christopher Wellin, Scrutinizing Familial Care in Consumer-Directed
Long Term Care Programs: Implications for Theory and Research, in CONSUMER VOICE
AND CHOICE IN LONc-TERM CARE 195, 205 (Suzanne R. Kunkel & Valerie Wellin
eds., 2006) ("There is ample evidence ... that the quality and continuity of paid
elder care are influenced by structural work conditions ... .
138. Howes, supra note 133, at 140-41, 144.
139. See supra notes 32-35 (highlighting poor working conditions in
home care).
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an opportunity to join forces and bargain with the state over the
terms and conditions that govern their provision of publicly-
funded care. As the next section discusses, the labor movement
can help workers achieve this objective even if they do not qualify
as state employees under applicable collective bargaining
statutes.
B. The Unionization of Publicly-Funded Home Care Workers
The labor movement has been an active force in organizing
publicly-funded home care workers, including workers who are
independent state contractors under CDC programs. The SEIU
spearheaded labor's first major accomplishment on this front in
California.14 ° As discussed in Part III.B., SEIU lost its legal battle
to convince the California Court of Appeals that the County of
Los Angeles was the employer of its publicly-funded home care
workers under the MMBA. 4' Following the court's decision, the
SEIU waged and won a political battle that resulted in the enact-
ment of legislation that required each county to form a "public
authority" agency to operate the county's home care program
and to serve as the workers' employer of record for the purpose
of collective bargaining.1 42 The law essentially created an
employment relationship, even as the counties would not qualify
as employers based on the common law control test.143 With the
law in place, the SEIU organized and won the right to represent
74,000 IHSS home care workers in Los Angeles County.
14 4
Since then, the labor movement has aided in the passage of
legislation that extends collective bargaining rights to home care
workers in CDC in other parts of the country including Illinois,
140. For useful discussions of SEIU's home care campaign, see Linda
Delp & Katie Quan, Homecare Worker Organizing in California: An Analysis of a
Successful Strategy, 27 LAB. STUD. J. 1 (2002).
141. See supra Part III.B.
142. Delp & Quan, supra note 140, at 1; Smith, Organizing the Unorganiz-
able, supra note 78.
143. See supra Part III.B. (discussing the ruling of the California Court of
Appeals that the County of Los Angeles was not the employer of the county's
publicly-funded home care workers under the MMBA).
144. Delp & Quan, supra note 140, at 1; Smith, Organizing the Unorganiz-
able, supra note 78. See also SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, BUILDING
A NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 3 (2004) [hereinafter BUILD-
ING A NATIONAL MOVEMENT], http://www.seiu1984.org/appResources/scDocs/
HealthDivision.Rpt.pdf (stating that "[m]ore than 150,000 California home
care workers are now in SEIU and aides in 19 California counties have now won
health insurance benefits").
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Oregon, Washington, and Iowa.'45 The unionization of home
care workers has had a notable and positive impact on the eco-
nomic status of the workers, leading to increase pay rates, health
insurance benefits, and workers' compensation coverage.146
Labor's home care campaign has also tried to respect the basic
premise of CDC. For example, while negotiating on behalf of
workers in Alameda County, California, the SEIU was concerned
about consumers arbitrarily dismissing workers.14 7  Yet, the
union contract between SEIU and the County ultimately granted
to the consumers a right to terminate employed home care work-
ers, with or without cause.148 As a union representative com-
mented, "I came to understand how intensely personal this job is,
and how important it was that the consumers had a choice in
who touched their bodies.' 1 49 To help those workers who did
lose their jobs, the union developed a registry of alternative job
opportunities. 0
CONCLUSION
Over the coming decades, as increasing numbers of elderly
Americans require long-term care, states will likely continue to
expand access to publicly-funded, consumer-directed home care.
Not only is home the setting of choice for most disabled elderly
individuals,' 5 ' but research also indicates that many prefer the
ability to control their own care.' 5 2 Yet while the shift from
agency-based care to CDC allows elderly consumers greater self
determination, this Essay has argued that it can jeopardize the
availability of fundamental workplace rights for home care work-
ers. This Essay's examination of various employment statutes elu-
145. BUILDING A NATIONAL MOVEMENT, supra note 144, at 3 (discussing
legislation to allow home care workers to engage in collective bargaining in
Oregon, Washington, and Illinois).
146. See id. (highlighting the benefits of unionization).
147. Delp & Quan, supra note 140, at 12-13 (quoting a home care
worker: "Sometimes these elderly consumers accuse us of ridiculous things like
stealing their clothes, and we might get fired or unfairly branded. The union
contract should protect us from being fired unreasonably.").
148. Id. at 12.
149. Delp & Quan, supra note 140, at 13 (quoting Patricia Ford of the
SEIU, Local 616).
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experts. See Lori Simon-Rusinowitz et al., Implementation Issues for Consumer-
Directed Programs: A Survey of Policy Experts, 24 GENERATIONS 38 (2000).
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cidates some of the difficulties that home care workers confront
when trying to secure protection from consumers as well as from
public agencies that fund and operate home care programs.
Given the cost of long-term care and the increased demand
for such care, the desire of state and local governments to estab-
lish CDC programs to curb costs is understandable. At the same
time, however, policymakers should be more attentive to the
potential costs associated with CDC. Depriving home care work-
ers of workplace entitlements, when the job is already riddled
with disadvantages, may further frustrate efforts to build a stable
and committed workforce. While this deprivation clearly under-
mines the well being of home care workers, consumers also stand
to suffer.
Even as home care workers in CDC programs may not tech-
nically qualify as public employees of state funding agencies, they
should at least be treated as quasi or de facto public employees
given that they are compensated with public funds and are sub-
ject to state regulations.' 5 3 The labor movement's campaign to
organize home care workers reflects this awareness. Through
the use of public authorities, unions have created employers of
record for workers and have successfully bargained with the
authorities to promote the interests of both workers and consum-
ers. Empowering elderly home care consumers is certainly a
worthwhile goal, and as the labor movement has demonstrated,
empowering workers is a worthwhile goal as well.
153. A similar observation holds true in the context of family child care
providers who provide publicly subsidized care. See Peggie R. Smith, Welfare,
Child Care, and The People Who Care: Union Representation of Family Child Care Prov-
iders, 55 KAN. L. REv. 321, 357-59 (2007) (arguing that many of the providers
should be deemed state employees).
